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Abstract:  
This paper uses sequential stochastic dominance procedures to compare the joint 
distribution of health and income across space and time. It is the first application of 
which we are aware of methods to compare multidimensional distributions of income 
and health using procedures that are robust to aggregation techniques. The paper’s 
approach is more general than comparisons of health gradients and does not require the 
estimation of health equivalent incomes. We illustrate the approach by contrasting 
Canada and the US using comparable data. Canada dominates the US over the lower 
bi-dimensional welfare distribution of health and income, though not generally in terms of 
the uni-dimensional distribution of health or income. The paper also finds that welfare for 
both Canadians and Americans has not unambiguously improved during the last decade 
over the joint distribution of income and health, in spite of the fact that the uni-
dimensional distributions of income have clearly improved during that period. 
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1 Introduction
The recent literature on health economics has shown a keen interest in the mea-
surement of health inequality and in its determinants. One of the more persistent
and salient findings1 is the existence of a “health-income gradient”, in the sense
that health tends to be associated positively with incomes. A seemingly natural
corollary is that health policy might usefully take place through income redistri-
bution and a general improvement in living standards.
A number of important difficulties arise, however, when it comes to analyz-
ing (and using) the link between income and health for descriptive and policy
purposes. Trying to influence health through impacting on endogenous socio-
economic variables such as income is tricky because of possible dual causality —
income may affect health, but health may also affect income, or at least be corre-
lated with it through other channels. Health-income links are also heterogeneous,
in part because health-related risk behavior is diversified and depends inter alia
on where individuals are placed in the income distribution2.
The measurement of health inequality also faces the important problem that
most available health indicators are of a qualitative nature, or at least cannot be
considered to have a cardinal content (such as for the usual self-reported subjective
health indicators). This makes it difficult to use such indicators with conventional
measures of inequality, in part because conventional measures of relative inequal-
ity need to use distributional means and that these are difficult to interpret when
variables of well-being are not cardinal3.
In spite of these difficulties, the analysis of the joint distribution of income and
health is important in order to apprehend well-being, partly because well-being is
increasingly considered to be multidimensional in the first place. The current
paper contributes to that literature by proceeding to a two-dimensional analysis of
well-being that differs from previous work in three different ways: 1) it is more
general than an analysis based on health gradients; 2) it is not hampered by the
1See for instance Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), Marmot (2002), O’Neill and
O’Neill (2007), and Deaton (2003).
2In the presence of such heterogeneity, Contoyannis and Forster (1999) show for instance
that a public policy that reduces income inequality may, under certain circumstances, leave health
inequality unchanged or even raise it.
3A variety of methods have been proposed to re-scale ordinal measures of health into car-
dinal ones — for examples and a discussion of the procedures, see Wagstaff, Paci, and van
Doorslaer (1991), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1994), Deaton and Paxson (1998), Humphries
and van Doorslaer (2000), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000), van Doorslaer and Jones (2003),
Allison and Foster (2004), and Zheng (2006).
1
ordinal nature of most health indicators; 3) and it is more robust to aggregation
techniques than the aggregation procedures usually found in the literature.
In practice, empirical work on multidimensional indicators of well-being jux-
taposes several indicators of well-being either by studying the uni-dimensional
(also called the marginal) distributions of each independently or, alternatively, by
aggregating somewhat arbitrarily the set of well-being indicators into a single one.
In order to compare well-being using both income and health indicators, this pa-
per proceeds instead by using two sets of relatively weak measurement conditions
that are sequentially applied to the measurement system. The first set of condi-
tions is that (i) both income and health are assumed to generate well-being (better
health can make up for lesser income, and conversely), and that (ii) the well-being
impact of an increase in income decreases with health (greater income increases
well-being, but the more so for the less healthy). The second set of conditions is
that (iii) well-being is concave in incomes (transferring income from a better-off
individual to a poorer one raises social welfare — this is also called the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfer), and that (iv) the income concavity of social welfare
decreases with health levels (to improve social welfare, a transfer involving peo-
ple that are both poor and sick will have a greater impact than one aimed at poor
but healthy people).
The paper then uses ranking techniques based on multidimensional stochastic
dominance4. The techniques can be applied to any bidimensional ranking of well-
being. It does not need to assume a particular functional relationship between
the two variables — in particular, it does not presume that income and health are
positively associated. As mentioned above, it is also not hampered by the ordinal
nature of a health indicator, and it also uses a more general aggregation technique
than most of the procedures found in the literature.
Applying that approach enables us to compare the joint health and in-
come distributions of Canada and of the US. This is first done using the Joint
Canada/United States Survey of Health. It is well known that the two countries
have a very different health care system. Canada’s health care system is almost
entirely public and is regulated by national rules that purport to enforce univer-
sality of access and of quality. The US health care system is more diverse, with
a more significant mixture of public and private provision and financing that is
conducive to greater freedom of choice and competition, but at the possible cost
4One of the first applications of this approach has been in the context of welfare compar-
isons of households with heterogenous sizes and compositions — see for instance Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) and Atkinson (1992) for early contributions.
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of greater heterogeneity in access to and quality of care. As we will see (and as
is also well known), the income distributions also differ significantly across the
two countries, with the US displaying both greater average incomes and greater
income inequality than Canada. Thus, not only can we expect the uni-dimensional
distributions of incomes and health distributions to differ across the two countries,
but we can also expect the gradient and the correlation between these distributions
to be different.
We also use two national surveys, the Canadian National Population Health
Survey (recently changed to the Canadian Community Health Survey) and the US
National Health Interview Survey, in order to obtain longitudinal comparisons of
the two countries in a context of important and rapid changes in the distributions
of both incomes and health statuses in the two countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sequen-
tial stochastic dominance approach. Section 3 presents the results of the compar-
isons between the US and Canada along with the results of the comparisons across
time of both countries. Section 4 summarizes the results.
2 Joint welfare dominance
Suppose that the population is split into K groups of health statuses with popula-
tion share denoted by φ(k), k = 1, ..., K. Hence
∑K
k=1 φ(k) = 1. Denote hk the
(ordinal or cardinal) value of the health level of those in group k, k = 1, ..., K.
Health statuses are ranked in increasing order from the lowest to the greatest health
status, i.e., h1 ≤ h2 ≤ ... ≤ hK .
Define F (y; k) as the income distribution function of those in health group k
— it shows the proportion of individuals in group k that have incomes less than or
equal to y. We will use the vector (z(1), ..., z(K)) to allow us to focus (if we so
choose) on different portions of the income distribution, y ≤ z(k), depending on
the health group. Furthermore, define ωk(y) as the contribution to social welfare
of an individual with income y that belongs to group k. Note that ωk(y) will
implicitly depend on z(k). Aggregating across incomes and across groups, this
can be used to obtain a general measure W of social welfare jointly over health
and income:
W (z(1), ..., z(K)) =
K∑
k=1
φ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ωk(y)dF (y; k). (1)
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We assume that the social welfare function is such that
z(1) ≥ z(2) ≥ ... ≥ z(K), (2)
ω
(1)
1 (y) ≥ ... ≥ ω(1)K (y) ≥ 0,∀y, (3)
ωk(y) = c,∀k = 1, ..., K and ∀y ≥ z(k) (4)
where ω(s)k (y) is the s-order derivative of ωk(y) with respect to y.
Assumption (2) means that, for measuring social welfare, the income threshold
z(k) for a given health group k cannot exceed the threshold set for less healthy
individuals since presumably these less healthy individuals have higher needs (in
terms of use of health care for instance) than healthier individuals. Note that
z(k) does not have to be upper bounded. It can in particular be set to exceed the
maximum income in a group k, subject to (2).
Assumption (3) says that income y contributes to the production of well-being
(the first-order derivative of ω is positive). An increase in income is always good
for well-being and social welfare. Such an increase is, however, particularly good
for those with a worse health status, as implied by the ordering of the first-order
derivatives in (3). This implicitly allows one to be concerned about the joint dis-
tribution of income and health. For given marginal distributions of income and
health, an increase in the correlation between income and health is equivalent to
thinking about a redistribution of income from those with lower health to those
with higher health. This will decrease welfare according to (3).
The combination of assumptions (2) and (4) implicity says that health also
contributes to well-being. The reason is that it takes a lower income z(k) (see
(2)) at a higher health level to generate the same level of well-being c in (4).
Combining this with (3), we can also show that well-being ωk+1(y) for a member
of a group k + 1 is always larger than well-being ωk(y) for a member of a group
k at any common value of y. This therefore says that those with a better health
status achieves a greater level of well-being at any given common income level.
Assumption (4) also allows to focus only on those with the lowest levels of
well-being. This is why it is assumed that ωk(y) = c, ∀k = 1, ..., K and ∀y ≥
z(k); as we will see, however, the methodology is general enough to allow for
wide ranges of values for z(k). This leads to the following first main result.
Theorem 1 (First-order welfare dominance) Consider two joint distributions
A and B of income and health and define ∆F (y; k) = φA(k)FA(y; k) −
φB(k)FB(y; k). Then, social welfare over the distribution of health and income is
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higher in population A than in population B for all of the social welfare functions
W (z(1), ..., z(K)) in (1) that obey assumptions (2), (3) and (4) if and only if
i∑
k=1
∆F (y; k) < 0,∀y < z(i), ∀i = 1, ..., K. (5)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Condition (5) is analogous to the sequential dominance condition in the social
welfare literature with heterogeneous agents — see Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1987) and Jenkins and Lambert (1993) for instance. It says that we should first
compare the income distribution of the group of the least healthy, then of the two
least healthy groups, and so on, until the entire income distributions are eventually
compared (up to the lowest z(i)). Equivalently, condition (5) compares the joint
distribution of both income and health, and implies thatA has more welfare thanB
if and only if the proportion of people that have incomes below y and health status
below or at hk is always lower in A. This also says that although the marginal
distributions (obtained in (5) when i = K or when y tends to infinity) do matter,
the correlation between the dimensions also matters in establishing dominance.
Theorem 1 is a very general result that allows for a wide range of assumptions
on the interaction of health and income in the evaluation of individual well-being
(the function ωk(y)) and social welfare (the function W ). It also allows for a wide
range of possible values for the vector (z(1), ..., z(K)). In fact, if (5) holds, then
it is simple to show that the ranking of A and B provided by Theorem 1 is even
wider.
Corollary 1 Consider two joint distributions A and B of income and health and
define ∆F (y; k) = φA(k)FA(y; k) − φB(k)FB(y; k). Then, social welfare over
the distribution of health and income is higher in population A than in popula-
tion B for all of the social welfare functions W (ζ(1), ..., ζ(K)) in (1) that obey
assumptions (2), (3) and (4) and for all values of ζ(k) ≤ z(k), k = 1, ..., K, if
and only if
i∑
k=1
∆F (y; k) < 0,∀y < z(i), ∀i = 1, ..., K. (6)
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 1.
The second main result is obtained through making additional assumptions on
the functions ω. Let
ω
(2)
1 (y) ≤ ... ≤ ω(2)K (y) ≤ 0,∀y. (7)
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Assumption (7) says that the second derivative of ωk(y) should be negative.
Social welfare indices are then concave in y and are thus increasing in mean-
preserving equalizing transfers of income; that is, they should obey the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfers (within each group k) and increase if a dollar of
income is redistributed from a richer to a poorer person. The distribution of in-
come within a group is therefore important in order to assess the contribution of
that group to social welfare. In assumption (7), the concavity of ωk(y), and thus
the social welfare importance of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, is also
assumed to be decreasing in k and hence increasing in the needs of the groups.
Said differently, the lower the health level of that group, the greater the welfare
cost of inequality in that group.
Let
D(z; k) =
∫ z
0
(z − y)dF (y; k). (8)
In the poverty literature, (8) is referred to as the average “poverty gap” for group
k at poverty line z. The second main result follows.
Theorem 2 (Second-order welfare dominance) Consider two distributions of
income and health A and B and define ∆D(y; k) = φA(k)DA(y; k) −
φB(k)DB(y; k). Social welfare is then higher in population A than in popula-
tion B for all of the social welfare functions W (z(1), ..., z(K)) in (1) that obey
assumptions (2), (3), (4) and (7) if and only if
i∑
k=1
∆D(y; k) < 0,∀y < z(i), ∀i = 1, ..., K. (9)
Proof. As for the proof of Theorem 1.
Condition (9) is identical to (5) except that it compares average income gaps
(instead of cumulative distribution functions) across distributions. Income gaps
are sensitive to the depth of income deprivation, unlike the distribution functions
used in (5). This is the reason for which Theorem (2) can rank social welfare func-
tions that are sensitive to income inequality. Societies with less income inequality
are less likely to lead to higher incomes gaps within health groups, and are thus
more likely to be considered better by criterion (9). The scope of Theorem (2) can
be extended as for Theorem (1):
Corollary 2 Consider two distributions of income and health A and B and define
∆D(y; k) = φA(k)DA(y; k)− φB(k)DB(y; k). Then, social welfare over the dis-
tribution of health and income is higher in population A than in population B for
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all of the social welfare functions W (ζ(1), ..., ζ(K)) in (1) that obey assumptions
(2), (3), (4) and (7) and for all values of ζ(k) ≤ z(k), k = 1, ..., K, if and only if
i∑
k=1
∆D(y; k) < 0,∀y < z(i), ∀i = 1, ..., K. (10)
Proof. As above.
3 Application: comparing Canada and the US
We now use the tools introduced above to compare well-being between Canada
and the US using the 2003 Joint Canada/United States Survey of Health (JCUSH).
This survey provides detailed information on income (a continuous variable5) and
health (qualitative self-reported health status). One important advantage of using
this survey is that the same questionnaire was used in both countries, thus leading
to exactly the same definition of the variables. One limit of the survey, however,
is that income in both countries is after transfers but before taxes.
We apply purchasing power parities from the OECD to convert the Canadian
currency into 2003 US dollars (that is, 1 $US = 1.23 $CA in 2003). Further-
more, as is often done in the literature, we divide total household income by an
adult-equivalence scale defined as h0.5, where h is household size. Incomes below
$5,000 are set to $5,000, and those above $100,000 (or $120,000) are censored at
$100,000 (or $120,000).
3.1 Canada-US comparisons
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution functions of the Canadian and Ameri-
can income distributions6. Canada dominates the US over relatively low income
thresholds, viz, income headcounts in the US are higher than in Canada when
income thresholds are chosen to be below approximately $10,000. For higher
thresholds, however, headcounts are clearly larger in Canada, and US incomes
are therefore larger than those in Canada over a wide range of percentiles. Table 1
5Note that the income variable is not continuous for those households that declared it through
a system of eleven intervals. A simple econometric model has thus been used in order to predict
income for those households and then simulate it within the intervals. Details of this procedure
are available on request from the authors.
6The cumulative income distribution function is given by F (y) =
∑K
k=1 φ(k)F (y; k).
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presents the cumulative frequencies of health statuses in each country. No country
seems to dominate strongly the other in terms of health. The overall ranking of
the two countries in terms of both income and health would therefore also seem
to be ambiguous.
We thus proceed to check for social welfare dominance jointly in both dimen-
sions. Table 2 presents 95% asymptotically derived confidence intervals for the
estimates of
∑i
k=1∆F (z; k) and
∑i
k=1∆D(z; k) for different cumulative values
of i (that is for the different health statuses ranked in ascending order, from poor
health to excellent health) and for various income thresholds z. The point es-
timates can be read as the midpoint of the confidence intervals (since these are
symmetrically spread around the point estimates).
We begin by checking for first-order dominance. This is done in Table 2 by
considering the estimates and the intervals under the columns headed by “(1)”.
The point estimates suggest that the joint cumulative distribution function is
higher in the US than in Canada over the distribution of poor and fair health sta-
tuses, regardless of the income thresholds — despite the fact that the US marginal
distribution of income dominates almost everywhere that of Canada (recall Figure
1). This is possible because Canada dominates in the lower marginal distribution
of health status (recall Table 1), and that this is not offset by a greater correla-
tion of health and income in Canada. Thus, we would conclude from these point
estimates that Canada has greater joint income-health social welfare than the US
distribution if the emphasis is put on those with the two least good health statuses
(poor and fair).
We can also use the point estimates to see how the US-Canada ranking is
sensitive to taking into account income inequality. This is done by considering
the second-order estimates under the columns headed by “(2)”. These estimates
show that for low income thresholds average poverty gaps are greater in the US
than in Canada, the more so when we focus on the least healthy individuals. The
social welfare cost of income inequality is then compounded in the US by a greater
concentration of the least healthy among the poorer individuals. The dominance
of Canada over the US now extends over all health statuses (up to “excellent”) if
z(good) is no greater than $25,000 and if z(very good) and z(excellent) do not
exceed $15,000. Thus, all of the social welfare functions W (z(1), ..., z(K)) in
(1) that obey assumptions (2), (3), (4) and (7) will say that welfare in Canada is
greater than in the US for a range of lower values of ζ(k) ≤ z(k), k = 1, ..., K.
This is a rather strong ranking given again the ambiguity of the ranking that could
be made using only the marginal income and health distributions.
Point estimates, however, can only serve to rank the two samples. For pop-
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ulation inferences, we must take into account sampling variability. We can pro-
ceed to statistical inference over the entire populations by verifying whether the
confidence intervals shown in Table 2 contain zero. Almost all of the first-order
dominance confidence intervals (those under the columns “(1)”) do contain zero.
We cannot therefore use the results of Theorem 1 to rank the two populations
with sufficient statistical confidence. The second-order dominance confidence in-
tervals also almost always contain zero, except for the combination of poor and
fair health statuses for which Canada dominates statistically the US at all income
thresholds. If therefore, we focus only and equally on those with poor and fair
health statuses, and if therefore we assume that ω(1)poor(y) = ω
(1)
fair(y),∀y in (3),
and that ω(1)k (y) = 0 for all higher k, then it is possible to say that the Canadian
joint welfare distribution is better than the US one. Given the ambiguous ranking
of the marginal distributions of health and income, this must again be due to the
fact that the worse income distribution function is Canada (due to generally lower
income levels) is compensated by a better health distribution, by a lower correla-
tion between health and income, and by lower income inequality in Canada than
in the US.
3.2 Temporal comparisons
We also use national health surveys to analyze trends in the joint health-income
distribution during the last decade in Canada and in the US. For the US, we use the
United States National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for 1997 and 2005. For
Canada, the analysis is carried out using the Canadian National Population Health
Survey (NPHS) in 1996 and the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) in
2005. For both countries, incomes are inflated to 2005 prices using the respective
consumer price indices.
Table 3 presents cumulative frequencies of health statuses for each country at
each time period. For both the US and Canada, the distribution of health status
seems to have worsened between the two surveys. Figure 2 plots the cumulative
distribution functions of the 1996 and 2005 Canadian income distributions and
Figure 3 plots those of the 1997 and 2005 American income distributions. The
income distribution functions have improved in both countries over a wide range
of possible income thresholds. Again, judging from the marginal distributions,
the ranking of the two pairs of distributions jointly over income and health would
therefore seem to be ambiguous.
Table 4 presents 95% confidence intervals for changes in bi-dimensional wel-
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fare in the US over the years 1997 and 2005. The sample estimates and the con-
fidence intervals provide congruent evidence, so we focus on whether population
rankings can be inferred. The confidence intervals for the differences ∆F (y; k)
and ∆D(y; k) all contain zero for values of k lower than “very good”. It is only
for k equal to “very good” and “excellent” that 2005 dominates 1997. Thus, only
if we abstract from heterogeneity in health statuses can we rank the two years and
conclude that welfare has improved over time in the US. This is in part because the
health distribution has deteriorated over time, but also because this deterioration
has not been offset by sufficient improvements in incomes for the least healthy.
Table 5 presents 95% confidence intervals for differences in joint health-
income welfare in Canada between 1996 and 2005. Again, we focus on whether
population rankings can be inferred and we thus check whether the confidence in-
tervals contain zero. The results are statistically stronger than for the US in Table
4. Two important findings can be drawn.
Firstly, the least healthy (“poor” health status) have seen a statistically signif-
icant deterioration of their welfare. Thus, if we focus on the least healthy for the
purposes of social welfare evaluation, we must conclude that 2005 is dominated
by 1996. This is because the population share of the least healthy has increased
over time, and because the income distribution has not sufficiently tilted in favor
of the least healthy — a tilt in favor of the least healthy could have occurred either
through a general improvement in mean income, a fall in the correlation between
income and health status, or a fall in income inequality among the least healthy.
Secondly, if we group all of three lowest health groups into a single group, we
must instead broadly conclude that 2005 dominates 1996. For first-order domi-
nance, this is true for all z(k) below $40,000. For second-order dominance, this
is true for all z(k) below $50,000. This ranking, which is rather strong, indicates
that if we are willing to ignore part of the heterogeneity in lower health statuses,
then we can also disregard some of the conflicting temporal evidence provided by
the marginal income and health distributions.
Thus, if we choose not to focus only on the situation of the two least healthy
groups, then we can conclude that the Canadian improvement in the income dis-
tribution has almost certainly dominated, from a joint welfare perspective, the
worsening of the health distribution. If, however, we decide to focus exclusively
on the situation of the group of the least healthy, then we also resolve the con-
flicting uni-dimensional health-income evidence, but this time we must instead
conclude that joint welfare has worsened in Canada over time. In both cases, the
ranking is robust over a wide class of possible income thresholds z(k) and joint
health-income welfare functions W (z(1), ..., z(K)), but the conclusions depend
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strikingly on which part of the joint health-income distribution is judged to be of
greater normative importance.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents bi-dimensional stochastic dominance procedures that can help
rank joint distributions of health and income across space and/or time. The proce-
dures followed are more general than comparisons of health gradients since they
are sensitive to changes in the entire joint distribution of health and income. Fur-
thermore, they do not require the estimation of health equivalent incomes and are
more robust to aggregation techniques than the aggregation procedures usually
found in the literature.
The procedures are illustrated by ranking Canada and the US using data from
the Joint Canada/United States Survey of Health. Canada is found to dominate
the US over the two groups of lower health statuses in terms of the bi-dimensional
distribution of health and income. Given the ambiguous ranking of the marginal
distributions of health and income, this must be due to the fact that the worse
income distribution function in Canada is offset partly by a better health distri-
bution, by a lower correlation between health and income, and by lower income
inequality in Canada than in the US.
The paper also uses recent national health and income data to compare wel-
fare in Canada and the US over time. Both in the US and in Canada, the ranking
over time of the uni-dimensional distributions of health and income is ambigu-
ous. Social welfare defined jointly over income and health cannot be said to have
improved in the US during the last decade in spite of the fact that the US uni-
dimensional distribution of income did improve significantly during that period
— it is only if we abstract from heterogeneity in health statuses that we can in-
fer an improvement in US welfare over time. This is in part because the health
distribution has deteriorated over time, but also because this deterioration has not
been offset by sufficient increases in incomes for the least healthy. In Canada, the
temporal ranking depends strikingly on which part of the joint health-income dis-
tribution is judged to be of greater normative importance. Aggregating the three
least healthy groups together, it can be inferred that the Canadian improvement
in the income distribution has dominated, from a joint welfare perspective, the
worsening of the health distribution. Focussing exclusively on the distribution
of the group of the least healthy, it must instead be concluded that joint welfare
distribution has worsened in Canada in the last decade.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We first use (1) and integrate by parts the difference WA −WB. We find:
WA −WB =
K∑
k=1
[ωk(y)∆F (y; k)]
∞
0 −
K∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
ω
(1)
k (y)∆F (y; k). (11)
Since F (∞) = 1, ωk(∞) = c, F (0) = 0 and since ωk(0) is finite, then, for
WA −WB > 0, we have to show that
K∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
ω
(1)
k (y)∆F (y; k) < 0. (12)
Recall that ω(1)k (y) = 0 if y > z(k). Combined with (2), we can then re-write (12)
as: ∫ z(1)
0
K∑
k=1
ω
(1)
k (y)∆F (y; k)dy < 0. (13)
The inner sum in (13) can be rewritten as:
K∑
k=1
ω
(1)
k (y)∆F (y; k) = ω
(1)
K (y)
K∑
l=1
∆F (y; l) (14)
+(ω
(1)
K−1(y)− ω(1)K (y))
K−1∑
l=1
∆F (y; l) (15)
+...+ (ω
(1)
1 (y)− ω(1)2 (y))∆F (y; 1). (16)
Denoting ω(1)K+1(y) = 0, we can thus rewrite the left-hand-side of (13) as∫ z(1)
0
K∑
i=1
[(ω
(1)
i (y)− ω(1)i+1(y))
i∑
k=1
∆F (y; k)]dy (17)
with ω(1)i (y) − ω(1)i+1(y) ≥ 0,∀i = 1, ..., K (given condition (3)). Note also that
ω
(1)
i (y) = ω
(1)
i+1(y) = 0 for all y > z(i) by conditions (2) and (4).
We can now establish sufficient and necessary conditions for WA −WB > 0.
Sufficient condition.
∑i
k=1∆F (y; k) < 0,∀y < z(i), ∀i = 1, ..., K.
Necessary condition. Suppose
∑i
k=1∆F (y; k) ≥ 0 and w(1)k (y) = w(1)k+1(y)
everywhere, except for k = i. Then, by (17), WA −WB ≤ 0, which therefore
shows the necessity of
∑i
k=1∆F (y; k) < 0, s∀y < z(i),∀i = 1, ..., K.
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Figure 1: INCOME DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS IN CANADA AND IN THE USA
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Sources: Authors’ own computations using JCUSH (2003). The Canadian currency is converted
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Table 1: CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES OF HEALTH STATUSES
Canada USA
Health status (%) (%)
Poor 3.3 3.8
≤ Fair 11.3 13.6
≤ Good 38.3 39.7
≤ Very good 75.6 73.3
≤ Excellent 100.0 100.0
Sources: Authors’ own computations using JCUSH (2003).
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Table 3: EVOLUTION OF CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES OF HEALTH STATUSES
Canada USA
1996 2005 1997 2005
Health status (%) (%) (%) (%)
Poor 1.8 2.6 2.2 2.3
≤ Fair 8.1 10.7 8.9 9.3
≤ Good 32.4 38.9 31.5 33.5
≤ Very good 70.0 77.8 61.7 64.5
≤ Excellent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Authors’ own computations using NPHS (1996), CCHS (2005) and NHIS (1997 and
2005).
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Figure 2: EVOLUTION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN CANADA
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are 2005 Canadian dollars.
Figure 3: EVOLUTION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE USA
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